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From Denial to Acceptance 
The Beginning of the Post-Doha Era
Last year, a policy brief in this series, The Doha 
Round: An Obituary, argued that trade diplomats 
in Geneva and national capitals should i) recognize 
the fact that the decade-long Doha Round negotia-
tions at the WTO have failed, ii) harvest the least 
contentious elements of the negotiations, iii) drop 
the ‘Single Undertaking’ modus operandi, which 
has become a straightjacket in recent years, and iv) 
explore other negotiating approaches such as pluri-
lateral agreements.
In the intervening period the landscape has in fact 
begun to shift in this direction. In comparison with 
the recent past, when an ubiquitous official state of 
denial persisted, negotiators have, in the past six 
months, made giant steps towards public accept-
ance that the conclusion of a multilateral trade deal 
on the basis of the Doha framework will not hap-
pen anytime soon. However, WTO negotiators had 
to endure one final desperate attempt to save the 
Round on the basis of an “early harvest”: advanc-
ing the less controversial items of the Doha agenda 
ahead of its core in an effort to build momentum. 
Such an effort, while worthwhile, is inherently dif-
ficult because in multilateral trade negotiations 
“everything is linked” and each issue is associated 
with ‘defensive’ or ‘offensive’ interests on the part of 
WTO members and treated as such in an effort to 
achieve a grand bargain among 155 negotiation par-
ties. Advancing individual areas ahead of an over-
all agreement is not a neutral exercise but favours 
the negotiating positions of some WTO Members 
more than others. It has therefore remained hard to 
achieve.
Sure enough, in the run-up to the 8th WTO Min-
isterial Conference in Geneva in December 2011, 
negotiators had considerable difficulties even 
agreeing on appropriate candidates for early agree-
ments. Ever changing country coalitions raised ob-
jections to each proposal, as it was floated among 
the membership. As the first among his colleagues, 
the U.S. Ambassador to the WTO Michael Punke 
recognized this problem in July 2011, warning that 
“continuing our efforts for an early harvest without 
prospect of success comes at a significant cost” and 
opposed further discussions aiming at such a deal. 
By December no viable path had been found, leav-
ing ministers at the Geneva summit with only an 
escape into the language of diplomacy in their dec-
laration “that Members need to more fully explore 
different negotiating approaches.”
Since then, negotiations within the WTO framework 
have not moved one inch further. On the contrary, 
in February 2012, a coalition of 15 countries seek-
ing a commercially meaningful accord on services 
trade voiced support for a U.S. initiative for a pluri-
lateral agreement in this area. This would exclude a 
majority of WTO Members in general and several 
large emerging economies such as Argentina, Brazil, 
China, and India, in particular, who are currently 
not willing or able to keep pace with the ambitions 
of this country group at this moment in time. The 
accord would, however, remain open for their acces-
sion at a later point in time. Among the supporters 
of the initiative are developed WTO members such 
as the EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, but 
also developing countries like Singapore, Colombia, 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Mexico, and Chile. Bra-
zil, China, and India, as well as the WTO Director-
General Pascal Lamy himself, on the other hand, 
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were quick to reject the proposal, citing its potential 
to undermine the multilateral trading system.
Be that as it may, the very fact of an emerging for-
mation of a “coalition of the willing” in favour of 
such an initiative encompassing an overwhelming 
majority of global trade in services, underlines the 
factual reality that international economic integra-
tion in the near future will largely take place out-
side of the realm of WTO rule-making. Against this 
background, an understanding of the current trade 
and investment policy strategies of the world’s major 
trading powers is an important means for a better 
appreciation of the directions that global commerce 
and economic integration will take in a post-Doha 
world. This policy brief, therefore, lays out perspec-
tives on the policy orientations of the three contem-
porary economic giants—the European Union, the 
United States, and China.
EU Trade Policy: ‘Global Europe’ at a Cross-
roads?
For the last six years, EU trade policy has consist-
ently followed the directions prescribed by the Eu-
ropean Commission’s ‘Global Europe’ strategy, first 
put forward by the EU Trade Commissioner at that 
time, Peter Mandelson, in October 2006. The com-
muniqué outlined in broad terms an unprecedented 
and highly ambitious bilateral trade negotiation 
agenda that aims at leveling the playing field for Eu-
ropean exporters and investors through the negotia-
tion of comprehensive trade and investment agree-
ments with major traditional and emerging trading 
partners. Since 2006, the Commission has aggres-
sively and with considerable success promoted the 
execution of this novel strategic orientation. Most 
recently, however, the EU’s political leadership has 
begun to add nuances to this trade policy, which re-
flect an increasing emphasis on the protection of de-
fensive interests in times of recession and economic 
instability, as well as the desire to (re-)gain leverage 
over difficult but important negotiating partners.
At the time of its release, ‘Global Europe’ responded 
to a growing awareness among policy-makers in 
Brussels and EU Member States’ capitals that Eu-
ropean commercial interests would not be satis-
fied by the outcome of the protracted WTO Doha 
Round negotiations at the WTO. What negotiators 
and policy-makers demanded, but could not receive 
from third country negotiators within the multilat-
eral framework, was substantial access for EU goods 
and services to the new growth markets in South, 
Southeast, and East Asia as well as Latin America. 
Moreover, in context of increasingly fragmented 
supply chains across borders, the importance of 
lowering trade costs and risks through common 
rules on competition, standards, intellectual prop-
erty rights and other ‘behind the border’ issues was 
rising up the list of priorities of EU businesses and 
governments. But WTO Ministerial Conferences in 
both Cancun (2003) and Hong Kong (2005) con-
siderably frustrated EU hopes that the Doha Round 
would ever deliver on any of the EU’s key objectives. 
At both summits, major rifts between the positions 
of developed and larger developing countries sur-
faced and left EU negotiation targets out of reach.
The subsequent release of the ‘Global Europe’ com-
munication one year after Hong Kong marked a 
major strategic shift. It put an end to the EU’s mora-
torium on the negotiation of commercially mean-
ingful bilateral trade agreements, which the EU had 
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put in place in 1999 to underpin its commitment to 
the Doha agenda. The EU de facto started to turn 
its back on the Doha Round, although officials in 
Brussels and policy-makers in Member States’ capi-
tals continued (and continue!) to pay lip service to 
WTO negotiations. Less than two years later, fol-
lowing the eventual collapse of Doha talks in Ge-
neva in July 2008, the Commission’s Directorate 
General for External Trade already went as far as to 
consider options for FTA negotiations with major 
OECD countries—a move that had previously been 
considered taboo, given the clouds that bilateral en-
gagements among the richest economies would cast 
over the Doha agenda.
Ever since 2006, the European Commission, backed 
by a trade-oriented coalition of EU Member States 
in the European Council, has spared no effort to 
meet the ‘Global Europe’ objective of ‘deep eco-
nomic integration’ with the commercially most at-
tractive regions of the world. In 2007, the Union’s 
chief negotiator launched negotiations with ASE-
AN, India, and South Korea. 2009 saw the initiation 
of the EU’s first free trade agreement (FTA) nego-
tiation with a developed OECD country, namely 
Canada, and the conclusion of the EU-South Korea 
FTA. Moreover, EU Member States represented in 
the Council gave a green light to the replacement of 
the troublesome EU-ASEAN talks by negotiations 
with individual ASEAN members. Consequently, 
in 2010, the European Commission initiated nego-
tiations with Malaysia and Singapore. In the same 
year, it also revived region-to-region negotiations 
with the members of MERCOSUR. Furthermore, 
in 2012, the European Union launched official talks 
with Vietnam, with a high likelihood that informal 
negotiations with Indonesia and Japan will soon be 
followed by an official negotiation mandate. Finally, 
strong business advocacy efforts on both sides of the 
Atlantic aiming at the initiation of negotiations on a 
EU-U.S. FTA persist and have gained increasing at-
tention from policy-makers against the background 
of a failed Doha Round.
Angelos Pangratis, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the European Union to the WTO, and Petros C. Mavroidis, EUI
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Considering the progress that has been made to 
date, the outlook for the successful conclusion of 
the regional agreements that are currently under 
negotiation is remarkably bright. Japan remains a 
notable exception, as doubts remain that Tokyo will 
be able to deliver on the removal of onerous non-
tariff barriers. But in the current climate, even an 
FTA among the western economic giants appears 
more and more conceivable. A step in this very di-
rection has been made by European policy-makers 
when they embraced the U.S. proposal for a pluri-
lateral agreement on services among a willing coa-
lition of (currently 16) WTO Members—providing 
yet another piece of evidence that the Doha Round 
is unlikely ever to rise from its deathbed.
In the meanwhile, the EU’s highly proactive bilateral 
strategy has been complemented by several more 
defensive elements, some of which are designed to 
(re-)gain leverage over large developing countries’ 
negotiators. Others follow a more straightforwardly 
protectionist rationale. 
First, the European Commission’s 2011 proposal for 
a revised scheme of non-reciprocal trade preferences 
for developing countries showcases the Commmis-
sion’s intent to exclude several emerging economies 
from preferential tariff treatment. The proposed 
revision of the EU’s Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP), which would come into effect in 2014, 
could strip upper-middle income countries2 such as 
Russia, Brazil, Argentina, or Saudi Arabia, of their 
traditional preferential status. In addition to com-
petitive impacts favouring producers in the EU and 
low-income developing countries, the new scheme 
would also endow EU negotiators with much-need-
ed bargaining chips and leverage in bilateral and 
2 According to the World Bank country classification.
multilateral negotiations. This is the case because 
the already low EU tariffs on industrial goods give 
little incentives to emerging economy governments 
to respond to the long list of EU demands. The elim-
ination of tariff preferences for these countries, in 
turn, provides EU officials with something to offer 
at the negotiation table.
Regaining leverage, by the same token, is at the core 
of the recent European Commission proposal on 
Government Procurement (GP). The regulation, 
which indirectly targets Chinese public procure-
ment practices, would allow EU Member States to 
exclude bids from companies located in countries 
that are not parties to the WTO Government Pro-
curement Agreement (GPA) and do not grant EU-
producers access to public procurement markets 
comparable to EU practices. ‘Reciprocity’, in EU of-
ficial-speak, is likely to be the new touchstone when 
it comes to tackling difficult negotiating partners 
through EU market foreclosure in the future. 
Other recent defensive postures, however, are tes-
tament to genuine protectionist pressures arising 
from the economic turmoil of recent years. The 
current economic climate appears to have divided 
the EU, broadly speaking, into a highly competitive 
northern pro-trade alliance, on the one hand, and a 
protectionist southern coalition struggling with the 
impacts of the crisis, on the other.
Along these fault lines, respective political battles 
have been fought out in the arenas of the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament (EP), with 
the European Commission in the role of a biased 
mediator in pursuit—so far, successfully—of open 
and reciprocal trade relations. Examples par excel-
lence that demonstrate the north-south divide on 
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trade include the political processes leading up to 
the adoption of the EU-South Korea FTA by the Eu-
ropean Council, the adoption of a safeguard mecha-
nism for the EU-South Korea FTA by the EP, and 
the Commission’s initiative to grant flood assistance 
in the form of trade preferences on textile products 
to Pakistan following the natural disaster of 2010. 
Most recently, the reform of the EU’s procedural 
rules for the employment of trade defence instru-
ments by the Commission has surfaced similar divi-
sions. The months-long stand-off eventually result-
ed in a partial victory for the coalition of southern 
EU Member States (including France), which ad-
vocated for looser procedural requirements for the 
use of anti-dumping, safeguard, and countervailing 
measures against third countries.
There has been a lot of white noise surrounding 
decision-making on trade policy in the recent past. 
This is particularly so since the EP has been given 
co-decision powers with the Council on trade policy 
matters in 2009. Parliamentary participation in the 
decision-making process has significantly changed 
the rules of the game and has rendered trade policy 
making in Brussels a highly political exercise, with 
an EP that has become a major target of all sorts of 
special interest advocacy.
The real test for the EU’s ambitions in the area of 
trade and investment policy will only come when the 
mass of agreements that are currently in the pipeline 
will arrive in the European Council and Parliament 
for adoption. Recent political quarrels may serve as 
a foretaste of what is to come. Given the grim short-
term economic outlook, the European Commission 
will likely face considerable headwinds, blowing in 
from the European South.
U.S. Trade Policy Under Obama:  
Running on Empty
For the past several years, U.S. trade policy has been 
running on empty. Globally, the United States has 
been mired in the decade-long Doha Round ne-
gotiations at the WTO, now dead in all but name, 
but still blocking the path of alternative multilat-
eral ways forward. At home in the United States, a 
cold political wind has been blowing. Popular anti-
trade sentiment has fixated on high external U.S. 
trade deficits and alleged “currency manipulation” 
by China as well as job and investment flight and 
the danger of a “race to the bottom” on labour and 
environmental standards. A long-running political 
stand-off has developed among key U.S. constituen-
cies, with polls showing that majorities of Ameri-
cans think free trade agreements have caused more 
harm than good and that “offshoring” is a major 
cause of domestic economic woes. The trend in re-
cent Congressional elections has been a swelling of 
the ranks of trade liberalisation opponents. This im-
passe on trade only deepened with the global eco-
nomic downturn: the last thing struggling workers 
and producers want is the prospect of intensified 
competition from abroad.
Taking office in January 2009, the Obama Adminis-
tration inherited these political difficulties on trade. 
Candidate Obama had blown hot and cold on trade 
in the 2008 presidential election. He jostled to posi-
tion himself as the most anti-trade candidate dur-
ing a long and bruising primary campaign, fought 
out to a large extent in rustbelt areas and aimed at 
winning core Democratic Party constituencies like 
organized labour. Upon securing the party nomina-
tion, Obama modulated his rhetoric and tacked to 
the centre. Predictions were that he would follow the 
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well-trodden path whereby Democrats campaign as 
protectionists then govern as free traders.
The outcome has been inconclusive. For the first cou-
ple of years the Obama Administration essentially 
took a pass on trade. Ron Kirk, a former mayor of 
Dallas, was widely viewed as a “caretaker” appoint-
ment as U.S. Trade Representative. There were few if 
any signs of a clear overall trade strategy. When they 
eventually emerged, plans for a government reor-
ganization of U.S. trade-related agencies contained 
the proposal that US Trade Representative (USTR) 
be folded into a new super agency consolidating the 
functions of the Commerce Department, the Small 
Business Administration, the Export-Import Bank, 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and 
the Trade and Development Agency. While govern-
ment reorganizations are often proposed in Wash-
ington and seldom gain traction, this signaled a 
clear downgrade of the independent functions and 
status of USTR.
Meanwhile, there has been no sign of movement in 
the U.S. negotiating position on Doha at the WTO. 
The current stance is still determined to a large de-
gree by the posture of the U.S. business community. 
Long dismissive of the Doha Round as insufficiently 
ambitious, the main U.S. business coalitions—the 
National Association of Manufacturers, the Coali-
tion of Services Industries and the American Farm 
Bureau Federation—continue to take the position 
that “no deal is better than a bad deal.” Unless this 
changes, it will be difficult for any U.S. administra-
tion to sign up to any WTO deal. It would be point-
less to seek the passage of any trade agreement 
through Congress without the support of key U.S. 
export interests. 
Recently, however, there have been signs of a renewal 
of interest in future directions for U.S. trade policy. 
These have taken a strongly mercantilist tone cen-
tred on the prospects for export-led growth. Prior 
to the financial crisis, global trade had been steadily 
Jayant Dasgupta, Indian Ambassador to the WTO, and Lu Xiankun, Counsellor, Head of Division for Cross-cutting Issues, 
Permanent Mission of China
8What Next in a post-Doha World? – Lessons from EU, U.S., and Chinese Trade Policy Strategies
expanding at twice the rate of global growth. With 
the state of the economy at the top of the U.S. politi-
cal agenda, it is increasingly argued that trade will 
have to play a role in any domestic economic recov-
ery. In his 2010 State of the Union Address, Presi-
dent Obama pledged to double U.S. exports in five 
years to create two million new jobs—an ambitious 
goal requiring considerable new market access op-
portunities for U.S. products abroad. As a result, the 
political logjam on Capitol Hill has begun to ease, 
with long-delayed free trade agreements with Co-
lombia, Panama and South Korea being passed into 
law at the end of 2011 on the basis of the inclusion 
of labor standards that both sides were able to agree 
upon. 
The Administration is also pursuing negotiations 
over trade and investment partnerships with the 
Middle East and North Africa as well as U.S. mem-
bership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—the 
latter prompting speculation about an implicit U.S. 
strategy of “containment” towards China manifest-
ing itself in the trade realm. A High-Level Working 
Group on Jobs and Growth has been launched with 
the European Union, and—as noted above—USTR 
is now looking into sectoral and plurilateral initia-
tives as well as bilateral investment treaties as possi-
ble elements of a proactive post-Doha trade agenda. 
In May 2012 the White House issued an executive 
order indicating a renewed effort to pursue interna-
tional regulatory cooperation “consistent with do-
mestic law and prerogatives and U.S. trade policy” 
as another means to reduce the barriers facing U.S. 
products overseas. Overall, export-led growth is the 
new watchword, epitomized by the National Export 
Initiative, an effort to marshal the full resources of 
the U.S. government behind a single comprehensive 
strategy to promote American exports. 
The political and policy calendars for the next two 
years present a number of opportunities and chal-
lenges for U.S. trade policy. These include reau-
thorization of the U.S. farm bill, the renewal of trade 
preference arrangements with developing countries, 
discussions with the East African Community on a 
new trade and investment agreement, the annual Af-
rican Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) sum-
mits as well as ongoing dialogues through the Trade 
and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs). 
With a presidential election looming in November, 
China, offshoring and unemployment will doubtless 
return to the political debate on trade. 
Meanwhile, changes are taking place in markets that 
are leaving traditional policy approaches behind. 
Companies are developing ever-more-integrated 
global supply chains and working more and more 
intensively with overseas suppliers of goods and 
services. The supply-chain approach presents a new 
model for international business. It also presents a 
significant challenge to policymakers. Altogether, a 
stocktaking and new approach on U.S. trade policy 
is long overdue. This will require some creative new 
thinking and concrete proposals that build on the 
lessons of past approaches while avoiding their pit-
falls. It will ultimately require a new political coali-
tion capable of charting a course on trade that can 
be sustained in the fractious and fragmented U.S. 
political system. 
Chinese Trade Policy: More of the Same?
China’s trade policy continues to derive largely from 
its broader national economic strategy. The push for 
WTO membership in the 1990s was closely tied to a 
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major process of domestic economic reform, which 
was at least as important a goal for China’s reform-
ers as WTO membership itself. The ambivalent at-
titude to the implementation of its WTO accession 
protocol followed the weakening of the reformers, 
and the strengthening of the view that not only had 
China “done enough” but that the agreement itself 
may have gone too far for the tastes of Chinese poli-
cymakers (and businesses). More recently, the esca-
lation of trade tensions with China’s major partners 
over market access issues is integrally linked to Bei-
jing’s efforts to promote national champions, and 
the relentless growth in the power of China’s State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Geopolitical considera-
tions have also played a role—the establishment of 
a Sino-centric economic order in Asia is as much a 
strategic project as an economic one—but the best 
way to analyze and predict Chinese trade policy is 
to start with the domestic. 
In this respect, China is at an important juncture. 
At the peak of the global economic crisis, it took a 
number of measures to sustain growth through the 
course of a downturn in all of its principal markets. 
Steps such as the $586 billion stimulus package, the 
huge enforced increase in lending from Chinese 
banks, and the freeze in the appreciation of the RMB 
certainly maintained growth levels through the cri-
sis but they also accentuated a number of imbal-
ances in the Chinese economy. There is a growing 
recognition among Chinese policymakers that steps 
need to be taken to increase consumption, reduce 
investment levels, reduce dependence on exports, 
and strengthen the private sector against the SOEs. 
But there are also powerful interest groups resisting 
the initiatives that would be required.
With the leadership handover due to take place in 
a six month period following the Party Congress in 
late 2012, it is highly unlikely that either the coming 
months or the first half of 2013 will see any political 
initiative to bring about major reform. The recent 
crisis over Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai only 
accentuates this. The result for China’s trade profile 
in the coming year is quite clear: more of the same. 
China is likely to continue to hold down the value 
of the currency to protect an export sector that suf-
fers from excess capacity; it will continue to try to 
protect a number of sectors through subsidies and 
restrictions on market access; and even though con-
sumption levels will grow in absolute terms, the 
larger proportion of its imports will continue to be 
focused on its production needs. 
For the most part, China can therefore be expected 
in the coming phase to have more defensive inter-
ests than offensive ones. Since tensions with its larg-
est trading partners are set to continue, it will look 
to preserve its market access and defuse the risk 
of trade wars. In a similar pattern to the previous 
couple of years, this will involve a mix of politically 
timed currency appreciations, buying trips, selec-
tive concessions in sensitive areas (such as the re-
versal of its indigenous innovation policies), and a 
robust defence of its practices at the WTO against 
the wave of cases that have been initiated. 
Less certain is how China will respond to the chal-
lenge in its own neighbourhood. China has sought 
to preserve and expand its position at the heart of 
regional trade and economic networks but new 
initiatives from the advanced industrial economies 
are now seeking to rebalance this. The Trans-Pacif-
ic Partnership (TPP), the proliferation of the EU’s 
FTAs in the region (dubbed “Asia-minus-one” by 
some), and even Japan’s efforts to reduce its per-
ceived dependency on the Chinese economy have 
certainly taken the initiative away from Beijing. If 
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the TPP succeeds—and particularly if Japan takes 
the difficult steps needed for it to join—the risks 
to China of being cut out of a newer wave of high-
quality plurilateral and bilateral trade arrangements 
will be felt acutely. Aside from some apprehensive 
public statements, there has been no direct response 
from China to the TPP, but it has moved to play 
catch-up with the EU and U.S. FTAs with South Ko-
rea, both bilaterally and through a potential trilat-
eral FTA with Japan and South Korea. The concern 
for China is not simply the politics of regional lead-
ership but that the trade “action” will move outside 
its control, with the WTO framework less central, 
standard-setting dominated by the other major eco-
nomic powers, and the higher-quality investments 
in technology and R&D attracted elsewhere.
For China’s reformers, this may provide an addi-
tional stick, just as WTO membership itself was in 
the past: rebalancing domestically is increasingly 
required for Beijing to get back on the front foot in 
shaping its external economic environment. Every-
thing about the political timetable though suggests 
that the earliest that this might even be a possibility 
is late 2013—and in the meantime, while there will 
be plenty of Chinese tactical responses in the trade 
field, there will be rather less of a strategy.
Conclusions
In the absence of a clear multilateral framework for 
trade negotiations, an understanding of the individ-
ual trade and investment strategies and initiatives of 
the major economic powers—and in particular, of 
the three economic giants of the EU, U.S., and Chi-
na—is critical for an appreciation of the directions 
that international economic integration might take 
in the near future.
Absent a new political narrative on trade and some 
difficult political bargains, the United States—the 
driving force behind half a century of global trade 
liberalisation—is likely to be the most hamstrung, 
unable to make major concessions unless there is a 
clear shot at significant mercantilist gains. Facing 
the impossibility of achieving such gains within the 
realm of multilateral negotiations, the U.S. has given 
up on the Doha Round. U.S. negotiators now seek to 
satisfy their business lobbies through the promotion 
of a plurilateral services agreement and engagement 
with eight (and soon, potentially, eleven) countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region, which has become the 
focal point of both U.S. geopolitical and economic 
interests. The outcome of either project, however, is 
far from certain, and much will depend on a com-
plex set of political contingencies in partner coun-
tries as well as the Obama Administration’s ability 
to break the longstanding deadlock and chart a new 
course on trade. The prospects for such an ambi-
tious agenda in Washington do not look particularly 
bright given the forbidding political calendar.
However, domestic political commitment to a bi-
lateral trade and investment agenda could gain sig-
nificant momentum in the United States if the EU 
remains successful with its current ambition to cov-
er the commercially attractive regions of the world 
with deep and comprehensive trade and investment 
agreements. In this respect, Southeast and East Asia 
make for competitive liberalisation battlegrounds 
par excellence. U.S. policymakers cannot afford to 
stand idly by while EU negotiators conclude FTAs 
with important trading partners such as Japan, In-
donesia, Malaysia, or Singapore—and vice versa. EU 
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trade officials, on the other hand, could soon face 
domestic political obstacles similar to those of their 
U.S. counterparts, as the dynamics of the current 
economic crisis raise protectionist pressures within 
the EU that increasingly find their release valve in 
the political arenas of the Council of Ministers and 
the European Parliament.
China, with its current lack of a clear economic in-
tegration strategy, could be wrong-footed if EU and 
U.S. regional and plurilateral initiatives prove to be 
successful. This is even more so in light of the fact 
that the costs of such success for China go beyond 
the mere loss of competitive edge vis-à-vis EU and 
U.S. goods and services exporters and investors in 
its immediate neighbourhood and elsewhere. The 
behind-the-border dimensions of 21st century ‘deep 
integration’ FTAs may, in fact, change the rules of the 
game in favour of the transatlantic partners. Should 
the EU and the U.S. manage to use their FTAs as 
a vehicle to disseminate their approaches to stand-
ard setting and conformity assessment, competition 
policy, intellectual property protection and other 
behind-the-border regimes, Chinese traders and in-
vestors will face considerable adaptation pressures 
that could come at high nominal costs and a further 
loss of competitiveness. Only time will tell whether 
such considerations will inspire the new generation 
of Chinese political leaders to take a more proactive 
stance in shaping the future directions of interna-
tional economic integration.
In the meantime, however, the default setting for 
global economic leadership will rest with the policy 
strategies of the transatlantic economic superpow-
ers and their tactics in the face of numerous chal-
lenges at home and abroad. Going forward, given 
the considerations at play in each political system, 
the stage seems to be set for a mixture of arm-wres-
tling contests and three-legged races.
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